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Abstract. In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship between 
political regime type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and the extent of 
globalization which of late has been considered as a path to development. We have made 
use of the Democracy index (and its constituent indicators) provided by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit and the globalization index (and its constituent indicators) of the KOF. 
Applying canonical correlation analysis on the data we have made an attempt to look into 
the response of globalization to the quantitative measures of democratic (versus 
authoritarian) practices of the governments in 116 countries distributed over Asia, Africa, 
Australia, Europe and the Americas. We have also tested the Lee thesis in the context of 
globalization as a path to development.  Our findings indicate that the empirical support to 
Lee’s thesis if extended to globalization as a path to development is superficial and does 
not withstand critical analysis. Contrary to Lee’s thesis, democracy promotes globalization. 
In African countries political discordance (at the national as well as international level) is 
not much favourable while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective of regime type,  
is in concordance with globalization. Therefore, it appears that democracies thwart 
development and by implication, globalization as a means to development. 
Keywords. Globalization, Democracy, Authoritarian regime, Lee thesis, Canonical 
correlation, Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, Australia. 
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1. Introduction 
his investigation has found its origin in the intrigue initiated by the so-called 
‘Lee thesis’ which asserts that democracy hurts economic growth and 
development. If the ‘Lee thesis’ holds then, by implication, globalization as 
an engine of development, too, would be hurt by democracy and, therefore, 
democratic regimes would be antithetical to globalization. Therefore, this study 
primarily purports to empirically investigate whether democratically governed 
countries in general have begotten lesser extent of globalization and juxtaposed to 
that whether countries having more authoritarian governments have attained more 
of globalization. Secondarily, this study also investigates into the instances where 
more democratically govern countries exhibit more extent of globalization and, on 
the contrary, authoritarian governments have thwarted globalization.    
 
2. Socio-economic systems as homeostatic ensembles 
Socio-economic systems have three major aspects or subsystems organically 
knit into them, which are identified as material, psychic and organizational 
subsystems. The material aspects characterize natural endowments, geographical 
attributes including location, demographic wealth, man-made material wealth 
accumulated over time and so on. The psychic aspects characterise the animal 
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spirit, the social psyche, the collective world view, the belief system, attitudes, etc. 
The organizational system has institutions or the body of all rules, formal as well as 
informal, that govern the activities of the people with regard to the elements of the 
system and the order in which they are put together, individual’s personal and 
inter-personal conduct, individual’s conduct to the social entities and vice versa, 
etc. in general (and any deviance in following those rules are socially discouraged).  
At any given time, individuals (agents) act under the psychic forces mostly 
following the organizational constraints as well as the drive to exaptation (Gould, 
1991) and set themselves to modify the material or organizational aspects of the 
system, successfully or otherwise. Individual as well as collective behaviour of 
agents has both a proximate and ultimate (functional or extraptational) cause and, 
therefore, the developmental history as well as the operation of current mechanisms 
matter (Buss, et al., 1998; MacDougall-Shackleton, 2011). Consequent upon the 
actions of an individual or a group of individuals, several types of feedbacks are set 
in motion that pervade throughout the system establishing homeostasis. In a lager 
frame, as time progresses the stress of material and organizational constraints as 
well as the impacts of individual actions accumulate. A specific energy builds up in 
a reservoir lying in the collective psyche or collective consciousness (Lorenz, 
1950; Lehrman, 1953, Durkheim, 1997).  This collective reservoir activated by 
natural forces, external forces and chance factors alter the ranges of homeostasis. A 
shift takes place which may be gradual or explosive. In many cases, the 
collectively accumulated impacts of individual actions make a collocation that 
waits until a ‘critical mass’ gathers, which ignited by a moving cause swings into 
action or set in motion a powerful positive feedback releasing the accumulated 
energy in the collocation. Depending on a host of conditions as well as chance, 
some systems may progress (evolve) slowly and gradually while some other 
systems may show up a marked jump to attain a punctuated equilibrium and the 
stasis in it (Gersick, 1991; Arrow et al., 2004).   
Democracy provides freedom to the psychic aspects to alter the organizational 
and material aspects, the circumstances to materialize the adjustments and the 
requisite governance geared to welfare. Too strong regime thwarts realization of 
capabilities while too lax regime, a soft state, gives way to frittering away of 
capabilities to dissonance. 
 
3. Political regime as a part of organizational system 
A political regime is an institution that primarily performs five functions: (i) 
defence from external aggression, (ii) making of rules to be followed by the 
citizens and the offices, (iii) governance to supervise that rules are followed, (iii) 
adjudication, and (v) creation, provision and maintenance of public goods and 
services. The first four functions are mainly for maintenance of order. The last one 
includes conservation, development and promotion of public welfare.  Optionally, 
the government or the office that wields power to perform all the primary functions 
of a regime can (i) control the public opinion, (ii) enforce morality, (iii) interfere 
with custom and fashion, (iv) create culture, and (v) take up coercive actions or use 
the state machinery for its own perpetuation irrespective of its performance in 
discharging of its primary functions. Democratic governments largely limit 
themselves to primary functions and permit the public opinion to evolve even if it 
is against their perpetuation in holding power, regardless of their performance in 
discharging their primary functions. On the other hand, authoritarian governments 
in varying scope indulge in the activities beyond the primary functions. In extreme 
conditions, authoritative governments take up the optional activities as their 
primary functions while the primary functions become optional activities.  
 
4. Political regime and development 
Development means the movement upward of the entire social system (Myrdal, 
1974). It may be noted that Myrdal’s notion of development includes Sen’s (Sen, 
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1999) notion of economic development (entailing political freedoms and 
transparency in relations among people, freedom of opportunity, including freedom 
to access credit, and economic protection from abject poverty), because no 
underdeveloped social system can provide the conditions that ensure freedom from 
hunger, freedom from tyranny and freedom of opportunity.  
Maintenance of law and order is necessary, but not sufficient, for development 
and hence the state must be pro-active to create the conditions for development.  
This is so because the psychic and organizational subsystems of the socio-
economic system have a strong tendency to homeostasis, arresting the 
transformation of material endowments and human capabilities to become 
resources (fruitfully exploited using appropriate technology in catering to the needs 
of the society). Secondly, economic underdevelopment itself has a negative 
feedback to weaken the political machinery leading to make a regime an 
‘impervious state’.  In a democratic set up where the government is elected by the 
people, impervious states turn to Myrdal’s ‘soft state’ (Myrdal, 1970) that are 
protective of rent-seeking tendencies at all levels. They are unable to maintain law 
and order also. In autocratic or authoritarian conditions impervious states become 
tyrannical where rulers become self-seeking. Impervious states vitiate the social 
psyche, the collective world view, the belief system and attitudes which, in turn, 
arrest efficiency and economic growth. Under these conditions, the people exhibit 
only weak will to development.   
It is natural, then, to think that development needs either a massive help from 
without the system (a big push) or a benevolent and wise authoritarian ruler.  A 
‘big push’ argument has been promoted by several economists, although only in 
matters of providing capital or technology. However, since institutions and the 
social psyche cannot be imported, a big push of capital or technology cannot 
succeed much. The benefits of Investment are marred by inefficiency and 
corruption while inflation and inequalities are amplified. Big push may also lead to 
dependency on external forces affecting socio-political freedom. In view of such 
possible consequences, an authoritarian regime with a wise and benevolent/liberal 
ruler remains to be the only condition for development. There are empirical 
instances in support of this line of thinking. China, Indonesia, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan have had authoritarian governments. However, those 
governments could see through the benefits of welcoming multi-national 
corporations, foreign investment, advance technologies and apt management as 
their means to foster development. As the governments in those countries were 
authoritarian, they could also curb populist ranting, rent seeking and the opposition 
to developmental activities effectively. They could make fast and firm decisions 
and implement them, resulting into rapid growth in those countries. On the other 
hand, India, a democratic country, lagged behind and possibly showed up the signs 
of being a soft state. For different reasons and in spite of a massive international 
aid, Pakistan, oscillating between week democracy and authoritarian regime as well 
as lacking a benevolent or liberal government, could not fast attain development. 
These empirical instances indicate that leadership quality and not the regime or the 
type of government make or mar socio-economic progress. It reminds us of the 
‘philosopher king’ of Plato (Bloom, 1968; Reeve, 1988). This conclusion is also 
akin to the one found in Kautilya’s sutras wherein he points out that governance 
leading to order, efficiency, opulence and welfare lies in ruler’s being altruistic, 
humble and wise (the attributes of a sage-king) which attributes are cultivated only 
if he listens to the well-meaning advice of the wise ministers (Kangle, 1969).  
  
5. The Lee Thesis 
Lee Kuan Yew, who was the first Prime Minister of Singapore and governed 
the country for three decades, was a development-minded and inspired 
authoritarian, albeit accused of promoting a culture of elitism among Singapore's 
ruling class. Lee, in liaison with a handful of other British-educated ethnic Chinese 
that he met in his Cambridge days, founded People's Action Party that 
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monopolized the entire process of selecting and grooming of future political and 
economic talents in Singapore. He promoted nepotism and did not spare his critics. 
Lee also discriminated against non-ethnic Chinese citizens although he projected a 
multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan image of Singapore (Barr, 2014). In spite of all 
these, his economic policies were insightful and fruit-bearing. To fight against the 
unemployment problem and to promote economic development he created an 
atmosphere that attracted American, Japanese and European entrepreneurs and 
professionals to set up base in Singapore. His policies made Singapore an ace 
exporter of electronic goods and an international financial centre. Under his 
leadership, Singapore succeeded in moving from the third world economy to first 
world economy in a single generation.  
To safeguard and glorify his authoritarian image Lee held that the ultimate test 
of a political system is not in whether it is democratic or authoritarian, but in 
whether it improves the standard of living for the majority of people. For Lee, 
political freedom was secondary while economic prosperity was primary. Lee also 
promoted the thesis of ‘Asian values’ that had an incompatibility with the 
democratic practices. He argued, therefore, that democracy hurts economic 
development.  This hotly debated argument has taken up the name ‘the Lee thesis’ 
(Sen, 1999). Yet, it is true that one must consider the urgency of bread over 
freedom although man does not live by bread alone. 
 
6. Empirical relationship between political regime and 
development and Lee’s thesis 
The issue has elicited many research studies. Przeworski & Limongi (1993) 
provide an extensive survey of literature on the topic up to the year 1992. We 
reproduce the summary of their literature survey (p. 61) arranged according to the 
association of the type of political regime and development. 
Where authoritarian government performed better than the democratic 
government: Huntington & Dominguez (1975) studied 35 poor nations during the 
1950s and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Marsh (1979) studied 98 
countries during 1955-1970 and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. 
Weede (1983) studied 124 countries during 1960-1974 and found that authoritarian 
countries grew faster. Landau (1986) studied 65 countries during 1960-1980 and 
found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Kohli (1986) studied 10 
underdeveloped during 1960-1982 and found that in the 1960s regimes did not 
matter for development, but in the 1970s authoritarian regimes performed slightly 
better than democratic countries. Helliwell (1992) studied 90 countries during 
1960-1985 and found that democracy has a negative, but statistically insignificant, 
effect on growth.  
Where democratic government performed better than the authoritarian 
government: Dick (1974) studied 59 underdeveloped countries for the period 1959-
1968 and found that democratic countries developed slightly faster. Kormendi &  
Meguire (1985) studied 47 countries during 1950-1977 and found that democratic 
countries grew faster. Pourgerami (1988) studied 92 countries during 1965-1984 
and found that democratic countries grew faster. Scully (1988; 1992) studied 115 
countries during 1960-1980 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Barro 
(1989) studied 72 countries during 1960-1985 and found that democratic countries 
grew faster. Pourgerami (1991) studied 106 less developed countries in 1986 and 
found that democratic countries grew faster. Remmer (1990) studied 11 Latin 
American countries during 1982-1988 and found that democratic countries grew 
faster, but results were statistically insignificant. 
Where regime type conditionally, ambivalently or inconclusively affected 
development: Przeworski (1966) conducted a study on 57 countries for the period 
1949-1963 and found that dictatorships helped the countries at medium level of 
development to grow faster. Adelman & Morris (1967) studied 74 underdeveloped 
countries (including communist bloc) for the period 1950-1964 and found that 
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authoritarianism helped less and medium developed countries. Sloan & Tedin 
(1987) studied 20 Latin American countries during 1960-1979 and found that 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes do better than democracy while traditional 
dictatorships do worse. Marsh (1988) studied 47 countries during 1965-1984 and 
found that there was no difference between regimes with regard to their impact on 
development. Grier & Tullock (1989) studied 59 countries during 1961-1980 and 
found that democracy performed better in Africa and Latin America while regime 
type did not make a difference in the development of Asian countries.  
Przeworski & Limongi (1993) concluded that we do not know whether 
democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. This inconclusiveness may be 
attributed to the problems of categorization (since all types of democratic or 
authoritarian governments are not identical). Barro (1997, p.50) points out that as 
evidenced by history dictators come in two types: one whose personal objectives 
often conflict with growth promotion and another whose interests dictate a 
preoccupation with economic development. Accordingly, an authoritarian 
government with the two opposite types of the leadership may have diametrically 
opposite effects on development. Measurement, modelling and mediation by or 
conditionality on other factors may also be responsible for blurring the relationship 
between regime type and development.  
A Lack of conclusiveness in the direct (immediate) relationship between regime 
type and development turned the interest of researchers to investigate into a triadic 
relationship between the regime type and the conditions that promote development 
and in turn into those conditions leading to development, although a quest of direct 
relationship between regime type and development continued. Leblang (1997), 
Halperin et al. (2005) and Knutsen (2008a; 2008b) found that democratic countries 
perform better at economic growth. Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) show that the 
relationship between development and political regime is not a direct one. When 
political competition is limited and also when the power of the political elites 
(rulers) is threatened, they would block development (political replacement effect). 
Political elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of 
political competition or when they are highly entrenched. Political replacement 
effect may be there in any type of regime. Boix (2003) and Knutsen (2007) found a 
positive effect of democracy on protection of property rights and rule of law. 
Knutsen (2008b) and Hegre & Fjelde (2008) found that democratic governments 
perform better on control of corruption. Rodrik (1998) found that democracy 
increases consumption through increasing wages.  As Myrdal (1972: p. 54) pointed 
out, increased consumption by workers in the underdeveloped countries may have 
efficiency-promoting effects leading to development which may more than 
compensate the opportunity cost of increased wages.  Summarizing the empirical 
findings on the relationship between the regime type and development Knutsen 
(2010) observed that globally, authoritarian regimes are associated with lower 
growth rates and higher levels of corruption. Even in Asia (for which the Lee’s 
thesis was purported to be valid) the thesis that authoritarian government will 
necessarily promote development cannot be generalized for all countries. The 
thesis is valid only for those countries that perchance had the authoritarian regime 
with development priorities.  However, if we accept authoritarian government as a 
path to development, there is no way to ensure that the rulers would have 
development priorities or they would be altruistic and wise or they would have 
well-meaning and wise ministers. Przeworski (2004) concluded that ‚there is not a 
single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development.‛ 
  
7. Globalization as a mediating factor between regime and 
development 
Until the World War-II, there were only two worlds, the capitalist and the 
socialist. Following the War, many countries that were colonies earlier assumed 
nationhood and those countries were categorised as those belonging to the third 
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world. The third world countries were in an immediate need to politically 
consolidate them as well as to develop their economies. The countries of the first 
two worlds were deeply involved in the cold war for their politico-economic 
supremacy that also had an ideological basis. The countries of the third world 
mostly joined the Non-Aligned Movement keeping themselves at some 
comfortable and politically appropriate distance from the two power blocs. The 
countries of the first bloc took upon themselves the moral responsibility of finding 
out the methods or the path, possibly with the economic and intellectual assistance 
of the first world countries, that would develop the economies of the third world 
countries through democratic means (without turning to authoritarian socialism). In 
that process, the gamut of the theories of economic development prospered. 
Meantime, some counties with authoritarian government forged a cooperative link 
with the first world countries to promote their economic development through 
integrating their economies with the world market and altering their domestic 
policies to suit such cooperation. Nevertheless, until the dissolution of the USSR 
(the central force of the Socialist Bloc) most of the third world countries were 
resistant or cautiously open to integrate their economies with the world market. 
However, after 1991 (when the USSR disbanded), most of the third world countries 
began increasingly allowing the flow of goods, services, capital, management, 
people, ideas and cultures  across the national boundaries and removing obstacles 
to such flow. This integration with the world market and permeability to socio-
economic forces may be considered as a mediating factor between regime type and 
development, making a triad. In the pre-globalization era, the governments in the 
third world countries had the responsibilities of mobilising the capital, adopting the 
appropriate technologies and managing the economic activities or projects 
instrumental to development. After globalization, these responsibilities have been 
at least partly shifted to international market forces. Now, with the growing impact 
of globalization, the concern of the governments is more streamlined or possibly 
limited to retaining political sovereignty and correcting the market forces and the 
obnoxious effects of globalization such as income inequality, aberrative effects of 
socio-cultural misalliance, etc. In this sense, too, globalization is a mediating factor 
between regime and development. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how 
regime types deal with globalization. 
  
8. A quest for empirical relationship between regime type and 
extent of globalization 
Democracy and authoritarianism are at the two poles in the realm of political 
management of the society and they are heterogeneous, qualitative, multi-
dimensional categories. Each one of them has its own history, society and culture 
behind it. Similarly, globalization is a multi-dimensional concept that has its 
economic, social and political aspects. Our objective in this investigation is to carry 
out a quantitative analysis that requires these qualitative multidimensional concepts 
to be represented quantitatively.  This venture has its own limitations and risk 
factors as well as its own attractiveness. 
A quantitative measure of regime type: Attempts have been made to quantify 
the regime types along a scale called Democracy Index with authoritarianism at the 
bottom and democracy at the top.  The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a British 
business within the Economist Group that provides forecasting and advisory 
services through research and analysis, has published the Democracy Index for 
2006, 2008 and 2011 and for every year afterwards. The index measures the state 
of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are UN 
member states. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different 
categories or dimensions of regime ranging from democracy to authoritarianism. 
These five categories are:  Electoral process and pluralism (EPP), Functioning of 
government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture (PCL) and Civil 
liberties (CVL). Subsequently, these five measures of different aspects of 
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democracy are suitably weighted and aggregated to yield an overall index (OSC, or 
the Index of Democracy with the score value in the range of zero to ten). On the 
basis of the score value (OSC) the political systems of different countries may be 
classified into Full democracies (score value in 8-10 range), Flawed democracies 
(score value in 6 to below-8 range), Hybrid regimes (score value in 4 to below-6 
range) and authoritarian regimes (score value below 4).  
A quantitative measure of the extent of globalization: A number of indices have 
been devised to measure the extent of globalization of different countries and also 
to study the trends in globalization over time. Samimi (2011) reviews a number of 
such indices. Among them the KOF index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher 
et al., 2008) has been constructed for many countries for 45 years (1970-2014) on 
an annual basis. It visualizes three aspects of globalization; economic, social and 
political. The economic dimension (E) of globalization takes into account: (1). E1 - 
actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio 
investment, and (2). E2 - restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital 
movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. They are synthesized to make E. The 
social dimension (S) takes into account: (1) S1 - trans-border personal contacts 
such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, etc., (2) S2 - flow of 
information, and (3) S3 - cultural proximity. They are synthesized to make S. The 
political dimension has only one aspect, P. At the second stage, E, S and P are 
synthesized (by a weighted aggregation achieved through the Principal Component 
Analysis) to give the KOF Index of globalization (Mishra, 2017b). However, 
Mishra (2016; 2017a) argued in favour construction of a composite index by using 
Shapley values of the constituent variables to the composite index and called it 
Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution (AEMC) composite index. In this study we 
have used the AEMC index of globalization, though retaining the KOF (2017) 
index of globalization for the sake of comparison.  
Some details on our analysis: Our study includes 116 countries for which 
globalization data are available for 45 years (1970-2014). This choice is important 
in view of the fact that the KOF index of globalization uses all data (for 45 years 
and 207 countries), with or without adjustments as the availability of data permits. 
This option puts different countries on different footings (some countries could not 
opt for globalization before the dissolution of the USSR and some other countries 
were deficient in recording information or rendering them). Since KOF uses the 
Principal Component Analysis for deriving weights by subjecting all data for 
statistical analysis, this ‘footing effect’ is carried to the values of the overall index.  
In view of this, we have constructed the AEMC index (for 118 countries) for which 
all the data for 45 years (1970-2014) are made available by the KOF. However, 
among these 118 countries, the Democracy index values for two countries 
(Barbados and Seychelles) were not available on the EIU site.  Under these 
constraints, we have proceeded only with 116 countries.  
For establishing the relationship between the Democracy Index and the 
Globalization Index we have used globalization index values only for the period 
2006-2014. We have obtained two vectors, the one that contains (for all 116 
countries) the measures of globalization corresponding the maximal overall 
globalization index value scored by a particular country during 2006-2014 and the 
other that contains (for all 116 countries) the measures of globalization 
corresponding the minimal overall globalization index value scored by a particular 
country during 2006-2014. Symbolically,  let it  be the value of the overall 
globalization index for the ith country (i=1, 2,..., 116) and tth year, t=2006, 2007,..., 
2014. From  it we have chosen two vectors, say G
H= maxtikG   = )(max it
t
 and GL=
min
tikG  = ).(min it
t
 These two vectors together represent the range in which the 
globalization measured by the overall globalization index has been attained by the 
ith country. Then, we carry out canonical correlation analysis for Democracy 
measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)2006 and globalization measures G
max 
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[{E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P}max  for Gmax or GH corresponding to the year (Year-H) in 
which the overall globalization index was maximum]. Similarly, canonical 
correlation analysis has been carried out for Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, 
PPN, PCL and CVL)2006 and globalization measures G
min [{E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P}min 
for Gmin or GL corresponding to the year (Year-L) in which the overall globalization 
index was minimum]. A special variant of canonical correlation analysis has been 
used. We have also done a similar analysis with Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, 
PPN, PCL and CVL)2016. 
 
9. Empirical basis (data) and findings of our analysis 
In Table-1 we present the scores obtained by different countries on the 
quantitative assessment of democratic characteristics in different dimensions 
(compiled by the UK-based company the Economist Intelligence Unit). The OSC 
(Overall score of Democracy index) and its constituents (EPP=Electoral process 
and pluralism, FOG= Functioning of government, PPN=Political participation, 
PCL=Political culture and CVL=Civil liberties) are for the years 2006 and 2016.  
In Table-2.1 we present the measures of globalizations in three different 
dimensions, economic, social and political, as visualized by KOF. As pointed out 
earlier, the economic dimension has two measures, E1 and E2. The social 
dimension comprises S1, S2 and S3. The political dimension has only one measure, 
P. The overall indices of globalization are KOF (measured by KOF) and AEMC, 
constructed by using Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution principle (Mishra, 2016; 
2017a). The values (E1, E2 though KOF and AEMC) reported in the row against 
each country under study pertain to Year-H (Gmax for Year-H) in which the AEMC 
index is highest during 2006-2014. These values present the optimistic or upper 
side attainment of globalization. In Table-2.2 we present the measures of 
globalization in the same manner as in Table-2.1, except that the numbers (for E1, 
E2 though KOF and AEMC) reported in the row against each country under study 
pertain to Year-L (Gmin for Year-L) in which the AEMC index is lowest during 
2006-2014. These values present the pessimistic or lower side attainment of 
globalization. 
 
Table 1. Scores Obtained by Countries on the Measures in Different Dimensions of  
Democracy 
SL Country 
Dimensions of Democracy - 2006  Dimensions of Democracy - 2016 
OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL  OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL 
1 Albania 5.91 7.33 5.07 4.44 5.63 7.06  5.91 7.00 4.36 5.56 5.00 7.65 
2 Argentina 6.63 8.75 5.00 5.56 5.63 8.24  6.96 9.17 5.00 6.11 6.88 7.65 
3 Australia 9.09 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.01 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00 
4 Austria 8.69 9.58 8.21 7.78 8.75 9.12  8.41 9.58 7.86 8.33 6.88 9.41 
5 Azerbaijan 3.31 3.08 0.79 3.33 3.75 5.59  2.65 0.50 2.14 3.33 3.75 3.53 
6 Burundi 4.51 4.42 3.29 3.89 6.25 4.71  2.40 0.33 0.79 3.89 5.00 2.65 
7 Belgium 8.15 9.58 8.21 6.67 6.88 9.41  7.77 9.58 8.57 5.00 6.88 8.82 
8 Benin 6.16 6.83 6.43 3.89 6.88 6.76  5.67 6.50 5.36 5.00 5.63 5.88 
9 Burkina_Faso 3.72 4.00 1.79 2.78 5.63 4.41  4.70 4.42 4.29 4.44 5.63 4.71 
10 Bulgaria 7.10 9.58 5.71 6.67 5.00 8.53  7.01 9.17 6.07 7.22 4.38 8.24 
11 Bolivia 5.98 8.33 5.71 4.44 3.75 7.65  5.63 7.00 5.36 5.00 3.75 7.06 
12 Brazil 7.38 9.58 7.86 4.44 5.63 9.41  6.90 9.58 6.79 5.56 3.75 8.82 
13 Bhutan 2.62 0.08 4.64 1.11 3.75 3.53  4.93 8.33 5.36 2.78 4.38 3.82 
14 Botswana 7.60 9.17 7.86 5.00 6.88 9.12  7.87 9.17 7.14 6.11 7.50 9.41 
15 C._Afr_Rep 1.61 0.42 1.43 1.67 1.88 2.65  1.61 1.75 0.36 1.11 2.50 2.35 
16 Canada 9.07 9.17 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.15 9.58 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00 
17 Switzerland 9.02 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71  9.09 9.58 9.29 7.78 9.38 9.41 
18 Chile 7.89 9.58 8.93 5.00 6.25 9.71  7.78 9.58 8.57 4.44 6.88 9.41 
19 China 2.97 0.00 4.64 2.78 6.25 1.18  3.14 0.00 4.64 3.33 6.25 1.47 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 3.38 1.25 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82  3.81 3.42 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82 
21 Cameroon 3.27 0.92 3.21 2.78 5.63 3.82  3.46 2.00 3.21 3.89 4.38 3.82 
22 Congo_Rep. 2.76 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35  2.91 1.67 2.86 3.33 3.75 2.94 
23 Colombia 6.40 9.17 4.36 5.00 4.38 9.12  6.67 9.17 7.14 4.44 4.38 8.24 
24 Costa_Rica 8.04 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41  7.88 9.58 7.14 6.11 6.88 9.71 
25 Cyprus 7.60 9.17 6.79 6.67 6.25 9.12  7.65 9.17 6.43 6.67 6.88 9.12 
26 Germany 8.82 9.58 8.57 7.78 8.75 9.41  8.63 9.58 8.57 7.78 7.50 9.71 
27 Denmark 9.52 10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71  9.20 9.58 9.29 8.33 9.38 9.41 
28 Domin_Rep 6.13 9.17 4.29 3.33 5.63 8.24  6.67 8.75 5.71 5.00 6.25 7.65 
29 Algeria 3.17 2.25 2.21 2.22 5.63 3.53  3.56 2.58 2.21 3.89 5.00 4.12 
30 Ecuador 5.64 7.83 4.29 5.00 3.13 7.94  5.81 8.25 4.64 5.00 4.38 6.76 
31 Egypt 3.90 2.67 3.64 2.78 6.88 3.53  3.31 2.58 3.93 3.33 3.75 2.94 
32 Spain 8.34 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 9.41  8.30 9.58 7.14 7.22 8.13 9.41 
33 Ethiopia 4.72 4.00 3.93 5.00 6.25 4.41  3.60 0.00 3.57 5.56 5.63 3.24 
34 Finland 9.25 10.00 10.00 7.78 8.75 9.71  9.03 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 9.71 
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35 Fiji 5.66 6.50 5.21 3.33 5.00 8.24  5.64 4.58 5.71 6.67 5.63 5.59 
36 France 8.07 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.12  7.92 9.58 7.14 7.78 6.25 8.82 
37 Gabon 2.72 0.50 3.21 2.22 5.63 2.06  3.74 2.58 2.21 4.44 5.63 3.82 
38 U.K. 8.08 9.58 8.57 5.00 8.13 9.12  8.36 9.58 7.14 7.22 8.75 9.12 
39 Ghana 5.35 7.42 4.64 4.44 4.38 5.88  6.75 8.33 5.71 6.11 6.25 7.35 
40 Guinea 2.02 1.00 0.79 2.22 3.75 2.35  3.14 3.50 0.43 4.44 4.38 2.94 
41 Gambia  4.39 4.00 4.64 4.44 5.63 3.24  2.91 1.75 3.21 2.22 5.00 2.35 
42 Greece 8.13 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.41  7.23 9.58 5.36 6.11 6.25 8.82 
43 Guatemala 6.07 8.75 6.79 2.78 4.38 7.65  5.92 7.92 6.07 3.89 4.38 7.35 
44 Guyana 6.15 8.33 5.36 4.44 4.38 8.24  6.25 8.33 5.36 6.11 4.38 7.06 
45 Honduras 6.25 8.33 6.43 4.44 5.00 7.06  5.92 9.17 5.71 3.89 4.38 6.47 
46 Haiti 4.19 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.50 6.47  4.02 5.17 2.21 2.22 3.75 6.76 
47 Hungary 7.53 9.58 6.79 5.00 6.88 9.41  6.72 9.17 6.07 4.44 6.88 7.06 
48 Indonesia 6.41 6.92 7.14 5.00 6.25 6.76  6.97 7.75 7.14 6.67 6.25 7.06 
49 India 7.68 9.58 8.21 5.56 5.63 9.41  7.81 9.58 7.50 7.22 5.63 9.12 
50 Ireland 9.01 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.15 9.58 7.86 8.33 10.00 10.00 
51 Iceland 9.71 10.00 9.64 8.89 10.00 10.00  9.50 10.00 8.93 8.89 10.00 9.71 
52 Israel 7.28 9.17 6.64 7.78 7.50 5.29  7.85 9.17 7.50 8.89 7.50 6.18 
53 Italy 7.73 9.17 6.43 6.11 8.13 8.82  7.98 9.58 6.43 7.22 8.13 8.53 
54 Jamaica 7.34 9.17 7.14 5.00 6.25 9.12  7.39 9.17 6.79 5.00 6.88 9.12 
55 Jordan 3.92 3.08 3.79 3.89 5.00 3.82  3.96 4.00 4.29 3.89 4.38 3.24 
56 Japan 8.15 9.17 7.86 5.56 8.75 9.41  7.99 8.75 8.21 6.67 7.50 8.82 
57 Kenya 5.08 4.33 4.29 5.56 6.25 5.00  5.33 4.33 5.00 6.67 5.63 5.00 
58 Cambodia 4.77 5.58 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41  4.27 3.17 5.71 3.33 5.00 4.12 
59 South_Korea  7.88 9.58 7.14 7.22 7.50 7.94  7.92 9.17 7.50 7.72 7.50 8.24 
60 Kuwait 3.09 1.33 4.14 1.11 5.63 3.24  3.85 3.17 4.29 3.89 4.38 3.53 
61 Lebanon 5.82 7.92 2.36 6.11 6.25 6.47  4.86 4.42 2.14 7.78 4.38 5.59 
62 Lesotho 6.48 7.92 6.43 4.44 6.25 7.35  6.59 8.25 5.36 6.67 5.63 7.06 
63 Luxembourg 9.10 10.00 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71  8.81 10.00 8.93 6.67 8.75 9.71 
64 Morocco 3.90 3.50 3.79 2.78 5.63 3.82  4.77 4.75 4.64 4.44 5.63 4.41 
65 Moldova 6.50 9.17 4.29 6.11 5.00 7.94  6.01 7.92 4.29 6.11 4.38 7.35 
66 Madagascar 5.82 5.67 5.71 5.56 6.88 5.29  5.07 5.92 3.57 5.56 5.63 4.71 
67 Mexico 6.67 8.75 6.07 5.00 5.00 8.53  6.47 7.92 6.07 7.22 4.38 6.76 
68 Mali 5.99 8.25 5.71 3.89 5.63 6.47  5.70 7.42 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.47 
69 Malta 8.39 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71  8.39 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71 
70 Myanmar 1.77 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88  4.20 3.17 3.57 4.44 6.88 2.94 
71 Montenegro 6.57 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.63 7.35  5.72 7.08 5.36 5.00 4.38 6.76 
72 Mongolia 6.60 9.17 6.07 3.89 5.63 8.24  6.62 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.00 8.24 
73 Mauritania 3.12 1.83 4.29 2.22 3.13 4.12  3.96 3.00 4.29 5.00 3.13 4.41 
74 Mauritius 8.04 9.17 8.21 5.00 8.13 9.71  8.28 9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71 
75 Malawi 4.97 6.00 5.00 3.89 4.38 5.59  5.55 6.58 4.29 4.44 6.25 6.18 
76 Malaysia 5.98 6.08 5.71 4.44 7.50 6.18  6.54 6.92 7.86 6.11 6.25 5.59 
77 Niger 3.54 5.25 1.14 1.67 3.75 5.88  3.96 4.75 2.21 2.22 3.75 6.76 
78 Nigeria 3.52 3.08 1.86 4.44 4.38 3.82  4.50 6.08 4.29 3.33 4.38 4.41 
79 Nicaragua 5.68 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35  4.81 4.50 3.29 3.89 5.63 6.76 
80 Netherlands 9.66 9.58 9.29 9.44 10.00 10.00  8.80 9.58 8.57 8.33 8.13 9.41 
81 Norway 9.55 10.00 9.64 10.00 8.13 10.00  9.93 10.00 9.64 10.00 10.00 10.00 
82 Nepal 3.42 0.08 3.57 2.22 5.63 5.59  4.86 4.33 4.29 4.44 5.63 5.59 
83 New_Zealand 9.01 10.00 8.57 8.33 8.13 10.00  9.26 10.00 9.29 8.89 8.13 10.00 
84 Pakistan 3.92 4.33 5.36 0.56 4.38 5.00  4.33 6.00 5.36 2.78 2.50 5.00 
85 Panama 7.35 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 8.82  7.13 9.58 6.43 6.11 5.00 8.82 
86 Peru 6.11 8.75 3.29 5.56 5.00 7.94  6.65 9.17 5.36 6.11 4.38 8.24 
87 Philippines 6.48 9.17 5.36 5.00 3.75 9.12  6.94 9.17 5.71 7.22 4.38 8.24 
88 Poland 7.30 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.63 9.12  6.83 9.17 5.71 6.67 4.38 8.24 
89 Portugal 8.16 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41  7.86 9.58 6.79 6.67 6.88 9.41 
90 Paraguay 6.16 7.92 5.00 5.00 4.38 8.53  6.27 8.33 5.71 5.00 4.38 7.94 
91 Romania 7.06 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.00 8.53  6.62 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.00 8.24 
92 Rwanda 3.82 3.00 3.57 2.22 5.00 5.29  3.07 0.83 5.00 2.22 4.38 2.94 
93 Saudi_Arabia 1.92 0.00 2.36 1.11 4.38 1.76  1.93 0.00 2.86 2.22 3.13 1.47 
94 Senegal 5.37 7.00 5.00 3.33 5.63 5.88  6.21 7.92 5.36 4.44 6.25 7.06 
95 Singapore 5.89 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35  6.38 4.33 7.86 6.11 6.25 7.35 
96 Sierra_Leone 3.57 5.25 2.21 2.22 3.75 4.41  4.55 6.58 1.86 2.78 6.25 5.29 
97 El_Salvador 6.22 9.17 5.43 3.89 4.38 8.24  6.64 9.17 6.07 4.44 5.00 8.53 
98 Sweden 9.88 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.38 10.00  9.39 9.58 9.64 8.33 10.00 9.41 
99 Swaziland 2.93 1.75 2.86 2.22 3.13 4.71  3.03 0.92 2.86 2.22 5.63 3.53 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2.36 0.00 1.79 1.67 6.88 1.47  1.43 0.00 0.00 2.78 4.38 0.00 
101 Chad 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.24  1.50 0.00 0.00 1.11 3.75 2.65 
102 Togo 1.75 0.00 0.79 0.56 5.63 1.76  3.32 3.58 1.14 2.78 5.00 4.12 
103 Thailand 5.67 4.83 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47  4.92 4.50 3.93 5.00 5.00 6.18 
104 Trinid&Tobago 7.18 9.17 6.79 6.11 5.63 8.24  7.10 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.00 8.24 
105 Tunisia 3.06 0.00 2.36 2.22 6.88 3.82  6.40 6.00 6.07 7.78 6.25 5.58 
106 Turkey 5.70 7.92 6.79 4.44 3.75 5.59  5.04 5.83 6.07 5.00 5.63 2.65 
107 Tanzania 5.18 6.00 3.93 5.06 5.63 5.29  5.76 7.00 5.00 5.56 6.25 5.00 
108 Uganda 5.14 4.33 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.76  5.26 5.25 3.57 4.44 6.88 6.18 
109 Uruguay 7.96 10.00 8.21 5.00 6.88 9.71  8.17 10.00 8.93 4.44 7.50 10.00 
110 U.S.A. 8.22 8.75 7.86 7.22 8.75 8.53  7.98 9.17 7.14 7.22 8.13 8.24 
111 Venezuela_RB 5.42 7.00 3.64 5.56 5.00 5.88  4.68 5.67 2.50 5.56 4.38 5.29 
112 Vietnam 2.75 0.83 4.29 2.78 4.38 1.47  3.38 0.00 3.21 3.89 6.88 2.94 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2.98 2.67 2.71 2.78 4.38 2.35  2.07 0.00 0.00 4.44 5.00 0.88 
114 South_Africa 7.91 8.75 7.86 7.22 6.88 8.82  7.41 7.92 7.86 8.33 5.00 7.94 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2.76 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35  1.93 0.92 0.71 2.78 4.38 0.88 
116 Zambia 5.25 5.25 4.64 3.33 6.25 6.76  5.99 7.08 5.36 3.89 6.88 6.76 
Notes: OSC=Overall Score; EPP=Electoral Process and Pluralism; FOG=Functioning of 
Government; PPN=Political Participation; PCL=Political Culture; CVL=Political Liberties; 
REG=Regime (1-Full Democracy, 2- Flawed Democracy, 3-Hybrid Regime and 4-Authoritarian) 
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Table 2.1. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization 
in Different Countries 
SL Country 
Year-
H E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2009 56.57 73.00 52.55 73.90 2.42 80.69 61.60 61.61 
2 Argentina 2008 45.92 39.11 43.30 71.50 41.47 92.07 59.95 59.19 
3 Australia 2007 74.79 81.24 73.40 87.55 94.03 89.71 83.80 84.03 
4 Austria 2007 89.34 86.56 87.06 92.06 95.54 96.86 91.87 93.95 
5 Azerbaijan 2007 67.38 63.70 37.92 77.61 34.96 54.01 57.02 54.69 
6 Burundi 2014 23.53 33.37 21.02 37.22 3.10 62.17 35.04 34.79 
7 Belgium 2007 96.71 82.81 81.94 96.39 91.22 97.67 92.41 93.75 
8 Benin 2014 53.79 42.92 28.55 39.46 2.48 75.17 46.67 48.99 
9 Burkina_Faso 2014 59.67 46.84 19.43 44.62 2.17 76.88 48.69 49.12 
10 Bulgaria 2013 80.04 72.93 51.55 77.71 85.30 84.96 76.98 76.34 
11 Bolivia 2006 62.03 59.79 39.52 51.01 3.78 75.69 54.42 56.38 
12 Brazil 2014 51.77 52.82 24.46 70.50 39.58 94.30 61.40 58.16 
13 Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 47.07 
14 Botswana 2008 77.58 59.64 59.54 57.17 5.88 59.28 55.50 60.64 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2014 49.56 28.29 13.44 40.71 2.24 58.39 36.34 37.27 
16 Canada 2007 76.20 82.03 80.78 94.74 96.09 92.91 87.15 87.51 
17 Switzerland 2014 95.02 70.51 91.77 87.57 94.47 93.40 88.79 93.18 
18 Chile 2007 82.68 87.08 41.25 77.69 41.18 87.67 74.31 72.77 
19 China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 56.85 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2007 63.35 40.17 41.85 52.15 2.85 70.72 49.83 53.08 
21 Cameroon 2014 44.96 38.31 16.91 52.02 2.24 73.16 44.20 42.75 
22 Congo_Rep. 2014 96.24 41.58 35.45 43.93 1.25 63.67 51.83 57.31 
23 Colombia 2013 58.32 57.38 33.46 69.69 38.12 79.65 60.15 58.23 
24 Costa_Rica 2007 64.79 73.30 60.37 78.75 45.65 58.63 63.66 63.45 
25 Cyprus 2008 93.50 84.06 88.10 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 89.36 
26 Germany 2007 81.36 84.49 76.35 87.52 92.57 92.43 86.48 87.44 
27 Denmark 2007 87.80 89.09 83.64 89.59 93.06 93.75 90.01 91.90 
28 Domin_Rep 2014 64.15 59.56 53.70 64.97 79.14 73.31 66.45 67.20 
29 Algeria 2006 55.36 52.55 32.39 64.92 1.93 80.65 54.00 53.32 
30 Ecuador 2006 55.97 46.00 36.82 65.37 38.22 79.01 57.39 56.77 
31 Egypt 2013 42.96 48.68 27.64 66.78 77.77 93.01 63.10 59.62 
32 Spain 2007 78.33 81.36 74.93 87.72 90.22 95.93 85.92 86.71 
33 Ethiopia 2014 24.93 28.39 19.32 33.17 2.85 82.51 39.33 39.87 
34 Finland 2007 85.16 87.39 72.07 90.60 91.67 91.64 87.22 87.36 
35 Fiji 2014 74.43 25.70 56.98 57.20 43.56 69.68 57.56 61.30 
36 France 2007 76.99 87.19 80.56 88.36 91.79 97.96 88.23 89.36 
37 Gabon 2014 75.55 42.75 52.22 63.44 2.36 72.30 55.96 59.46 
38 U.K. 2006 81.91 89.75 79.57 90.54 93.30 94.90 89.06 89.91 
39 Ghana 2014 62.30 54.48 27.85 45.77 3.96 85.72 54.17 55.67 
40 Guinea 2014 57.21 31.29 21.72 41.38 2.73 76.19 44.40 46.82 
41 Gambia  2006 70.76 49.68 45.63 57.79 6.31 61.86 51.78 54.92 
42 Greece 2007 68.15 83.53 76.51 83.41 85.44 92.38 82.59 83.44 
43 Guatemala 2014 48.00 74.96 26.23 57.23 42.95 83.01 60.42 57.71 
44 Guyana 2006 80.52 62.07 56.43 55.51 44.10 43.34 56.44 59.99 
45 Honduras 2014 74.61 71.19 28.45 58.46 39.51 71.84 61.42 60.57 
46 Haiti 2010 34.21 62.93 28.71 50.84 1.00 45.88 39.36 38.47 
47 Hungary 2009 92.14 85.86 65.93 89.31 89.62 91.47 86.99 87.02 
48 Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.40 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 57.96 
49 India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.10 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 50.87 
50 Ireland 2014 99.52 89.78 89.37 91.72 91.88 90.47 92.15 95.20 
51 Iceland 2008 89.32 64.89 81.47 80.36 91.88 70.11 77.86 81.39 
52 Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.79 
53 Italy 2007 68.17 83.24 70.46 78.72 86.52 97.92 82.85 83.57 
54 Jamaica 2007 80.64 70.00 63.13 69.52 7.11 68.56 62.72 66.57 
55 Jordan 2006 79.36 59.47 67.97 71.54 41.11 84.27 70.31 73.94 
56 Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.10 72.26 68.81 
57 Kenya 2007 27.19 46.79 29.61 46.02 3.72 82.92 46.46 45.80 
58 Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 54.22 
59 South_Korea  2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.05 
60 Kuwait 2008 61.31 75.01 78.96 76.28 90.41 59.54 70.76 72.18 
61 Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.30 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.50 74.20 
62 Lesotho 2014 80.48 41.22 25.58 48.74 6.87 54.09 45.94 48.77 
63 Luxembourg 2007 100.00 88.46 96.09 97.51 48.25 80.06 85.62 89.59 
64 Morocco 2014 60.71 53.68 45.87 83.86 37.71 89.50 65.95 64.33 
65 Moldova 2007 67.96 69.67 44.90 84.17 39.27 67.22 64.04 61.70 
66 Madagascar 2014 62.47 36.71 11.21 48.02 2.73 65.10 42.90 42.98 
67 Mexico 2014 63.45 68.45 44.30 68.92 40.12 71.72 62.29 61.61 
68 Mali 2014 50.97 41.67 22.46 44.10 1.12 75.98 46.07 46.72 
69 Malta 2009 99.76 87.06 83.18 96.04 49.74 52.58 76.16 78.24 
70 Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1.00 44.74 39.03 38.40 
71 Montenegro 2010 81.65 79.55 72.69 94.41 5.08 56.33 65.48 66.92 
72 Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.40 1.43 71.89 56.91 55.63 
73 Mauritania 2014 79.30 58.16 19.77 51.82 1.37 66.99 51.45 52.55 
74 Mauritius 2014 91.12 84.89 58.78 82.06 42.61 45.32 66.61 66.81 
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75 Malawi 2013 49.90 52.47 26.25 41.95 6.99 64.35 45.40 46.09 
76 Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 81.07 
77 Niger 2014 54.67 50.44 32.41 35.30 1.74 74.33 47.92 50.86 
78 Nigeria 2009 65.10 47.51 12.39 52.93 3.47 89.37 54.36 52.53 
79 Nicaragua 2012 61.15 61.69 34.97 56.57 40.24 57.38 53.99 53.56 
80 Netherlands 2014 97.64 88.48 85.98 93.26 92.75 95.41 92.84 95.24 
81 Norway 2013 80.32 72.93 81.74 85.52 91.68 92.27 84.48 86.83 
82 Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 36.70 
83 New_Zealand 2008 76.62 90.04 79.32 91.46 50.44 80.05 79.17 80.12 
84 Pakistan 2007 40.85 43.25 23.40 44.12 32.38 87.55 51.83 51.16 
85 Panama 2009 89.59 71.32 50.84 81.17 47.74 60.74 67.70 67.56 
86 Peru 2011 69.02 82.53 32.33 58.27 36.87 84.74 66.14 65.24 
87 Philippines 2006 65.22 52.73 30.26 49.70 39.96 81.96 58.39 59.19 
88 Poland 2014 77.73 76.38 57.40 92.23 89.22 88.82 81.32 79.32 
89 Portugal 2007 82.71 87.10 76.48 91.10 88.73 93.85 87.61 88.21 
90 Paraguay 2012 62.44 56.59 36.33 65.09 39.86 77.61 60.13 59.39 
91 Romania 2014 60.67 83.22 48.07 82.02 82.39 89.82 76.51 73.36 
92 Rwanda 2014 34.81 63.91 17.27 39.87 7.05 71.53 45.56 43.83 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2009 62.95 76.19 69.00 71.18 83.25 60.43 68.43 69.75 
94 Senegal 2012 57.58 47.32 29.33 58.91 3.53 87.90 54.64 54.59 
95 Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 91.52 
96 Sierra_Leone 2011 69.70 46.89 19.84 38.92 3.16 65.10 45.90 48.29 
97 El_Salvador 2007 61.06 72.79 49.35 64.68 40.80 75.40 63.79 64.02 
98 Sweden 2007 88.33 86.26 80.84 84.38 94.73 96.03 89.41 91.73 
99 Swaziland 2014 77.83 43.61 59.31 60.20 6.37 36.55 47.48 51.92 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1.00 52.73 48.93 50.02 
101 Chad 2006 55.49 27.21 23.94 32.35 2.91 60.04 38.37 41.70 
102 Togo 2014 78.62 46.54 25.04 57.99 3.72 73.38 53.70 54.25 
103 Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.90 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 71.71 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2012 86.13 68.86 58.65 67.24 41.73 53.54 63.09 65.62 
105 Tunisia 2008 70.83 48.71 41.68 76.78 2.67 86.29 60.45 60.63 
106 Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 69.88 
107 Tanzania 2007 35.61 53.20 16.78 31.93 3.04 55.74 37.71 37.42 
108 Uganda 2013 44.01 58.02 21.59 37.01 4.52 70.23 45.48 45.69 
109 Uruguay 2008 65.66 68.87 51.35 65.92 42.10 85.45 67.23 68.14 
110 U.S.A. 2007 65.17 85.34 67.13 82.45 91.90 92.10 81.80 81.15 
111 Venezuela_RB 2006 62.32 47.83 38.48 68.43 41.65 65.68 56.17 55.45 
112 Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 54.98 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2008 53.37 63.83 23.57 41.91 1.68 62.24 46.51 46.66 
114 South_Africa 2014 72.64 65.18 41.53 61.39 41.93 88.04 66.72 67.54 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2013 69.13 37.26 6.23 43.38 1.00 62.03 41.67 42.31 
116 Zambia 2007 64.24 63.96 27.92 45.69 4.09 73.93 52.96 54.04 
Notes: E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-H when the overall index AEMC attained 
maximum (Gmax) during 2006-2014 
 
Table 2.2. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization 
in Different Countries 
SL Country 
Year-
L E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2006 35.89 58.68 52.56 69.39 2.24 67.63 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 2012 41.13 30.68 43.54 72.69 40.54 92.83 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 2013 68.41 78.01 73.79 85.80 92.90 90.42 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 2013 85.52 76.50 86.51 91.31 95.46 96.36 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 2009 59.96 57.99 38.90 78.95 34.51 55.51 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 2006 24.06 35.17 16.96 35.39 4.15 36.97 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 2013 95.51 73.19 84.04 96.99 91.01 96.51 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 2006 28.32 40.26 28.88 35.40 2.54 71.83 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 2006 16.39 50.78 32.95 36.90 3.90 71.57 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 2010 71.76 74.41 50.21 82.83 40.81 83.13 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 2011 56.44 50.56 37.79 58.44 2.91 76.81 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 2008 48.27 53.34 20.26 68.50 38.23 92.27 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 2007 34.97 56.40 46.37 41.28 5.32 21.18 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 2012 60.07 53.50 56.45 55.16 4.95 39.77 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2007 40.14 22.02 15.27 32.43 2.24 57.98 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 2013 74.03 77.68 81.23 92.24 94.97 92.94 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 2011 94.70 60.22 91.35 89.06 94.96 92.44 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 2013 77.71 75.92 38.21 76.16 40.69 88.74 71.11 69.54 
19 China 2012 41.21 56.27 16.75 65.54 78.02 84.80 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2013 56.86 36.44 29.24 53.69 2.61 74.19 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 2010 35.79 41.44 16.83 51.95 2.73 70.25 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 2008 91.35 37.23 31.94 40.90 1.74 39.88 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 2008 54.98 42.87 30.73 70.80 38.22 78.48 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 2013 62.90 66.25 55.31 81.31 45.89 59.43 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 2006 91.53 84.62 86.55 95.34 47.57 59.05 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 2013 75.94 73.34 79.32 85.40 92.01 91.93 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 2013 84.52 80.70 81.47 88.35 93.53 91.65 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 2009 54.07 57.06 53.37 67.39 36.62 56.88 55.00 55.44 
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29 Algeria 2007 49.62 47.76 33.94 64.81 2.05 48.49 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 2014 40.55 36.53 34.14 62.25 38.21 80.97 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 2012 41.62 46.07 22.45 66.66 35.94 93.45 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 2013 75.24 74.68 73.88 86.21 89.60 95.51 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 2011 28.98 21.94 10.54 29.29 2.17 81.88 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 2009 77.81 86.19 72.26 88.86 91.36 90.25 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 2009 64.73 25.64 56.01 50.18 43.87 66.56 53.75 57.81 
36 France 2013 73.58 78.12 81.13 89.14 92.48 97.29 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 2011 75.77 31.78 51.97 61.25 2.36 51.11 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 2014 80.71 85.27 76.35 87.66 93.64 94.67 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 2008 36.37 51.83 35.82 43.80 4.52 83.98 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 2010 35.70 31.29 21.36 39.92 4.15 71.90 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  2009 50.86 50.47 45.99 61.95 5.38 64.80 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 2012 61.28 77.37 75.14 84.24 84.42 91.33 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 2010 46.46 68.40 27.08 56.03 43.98 82.47 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 2013 61.74 58.98 48.79 58.06 5.76 44.66 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 2010 63.36 65.10 30.16 60.23 39.72 70.29 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 2014 35.21 68.47 6.41 51.82 1.00 48.28 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 2011 91.22 81.45 66.67 89.18 90.33 90.93 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 2008 49.64 69.02 17.85 47.95 33.79 84.05 56.64 54.53 
49 India 2006 35.28 43.76 13.64 46.46 32.53 89.37 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 2008 97.80 88.49 91.12 92.11 48.10 87.41 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 2013 89.48 59.80 80.56 78.37 50.11 54.09 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 2011 69.88 76.98 75.38 66.87 90.37 65.01 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 2013 64.98 75.44 70.42 78.44 88.21 97.52 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 2014 73.94 51.72 57.00 67.13 6.93 72.58 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 2013 72.22 61.91 52.07 69.51 42.37 86.09 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 2011 43.92 65.57 42.19 76.22 87.85 88.66 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 2012 25.69 44.87 19.21 48.47 3.59 82.94 45.16 42.55 
58 Cambodia 2011 70.40 50.86 26.14 44.44 2.17 59.93 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  2006 54.55 65.58 39.06 76.10 41.38 83.59 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 2013 53.45 65.47 70.68 73.63 89.69 60.31 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 2011 77.07 56.80 70.26 90.02 45.95 60.76 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 2006 59.43 37.57 24.70 45.45 6.68 33.39 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 2006 99.72 87.43 96.37 96.87 48.06 60.97 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 2006 49.22 40.66 35.46 67.40 37.20 87.73 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 2014 60.52 63.40 40.67 84.06 37.77 69.00 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 2011 56.71 28.24 8.15 49.42 2.67 63.64 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 2008 55.23 60.32 42.67 70.30 41.09 70.95 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 2007 44.08 41.64 20.96 36.32 2.17 73.60 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 2006 97.19 87.13 83.62 96.07 50.17 47.77 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 2009 47.20 49.84 9.82 27.94 1.00 36.00 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 2006 52.52 76.75 73.23 94.86 6.25 46.57 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 2006 54.54 60.02 19.54 57.15 2.05 65.31 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 2006 72.75 40.60 25.64 43.51 1.37 45.02 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 2006 57.62 70.87 59.49 85.06 40.57 57.79 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 2009 32.32 44.30 27.07 39.17 6.74 61.73 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 2014 88.91 66.95 57.96 77.28 87.65 83.69 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 2007 24.17 37.19 32.59 30.52 1.68 71.94 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 2014 46.48 52.49 9.46 46.64 1.43 90.79 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 2008 53.72 63.14 35.68 56.50 39.11 55.74 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 2009 95.28 88.51 84.91 90.53 92.90 93.23 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 2006 81.16 70.67 79.65 83.91 91.99 88.88 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 2008 11.40 31.69 25.16 37.96 3.35 68.10 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 2013 72.83 85.72 78.84 89.57 50.42 80.03 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 2014 33.87 45.27 19.22 48.01 32.32 87.30 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 2006 91.07 65.78 50.23 73.96 47.74 56.13 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 2006 66.78 67.15 32.70 54.46 37.01 84.09 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 2014 58.47 49.32 24.22 54.23 41.28 82.83 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 2011 72.22 68.03 56.29 91.86 87.36 89.58 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 2013 79.89 82.09 68.63 91.19 89.70 88.98 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 2008 53.18 57.92 36.26 60.83 37.09 75.13 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 2006 60.44 60.73 44.18 78.72 38.69 89.91 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 2006 19.54 34.11 23.81 38.03 4.27 60.31 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2006 52.82 76.19 70.24 69.12 82.06 57.24 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 2006 40.99 38.14 40.60 58.22 4.09 86.13 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 2014 99.01 96.53 93.20 85.75 96.53 54.77 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 2009 30.15 41.28 19.63 33.56 3.22 61.16 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 2011 57.17 63.11 35.53 66.64 41.19 78.63 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 2013 85.48 75.35 81.30 81.02 93.46 94.65 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 2007 63.20 36.36 61.97 54.71 6.37 33.68 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2007 49.06 38.95 43.38 63.66 1.00 54.93 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 2011 50.22 28.12 19.94 36.74 2.91 58.55 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 2008 53.50 37.49 28.74 54.91 3.53 71.19 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 2008 74.06 55.41 39.67 68.67 37.94 78.48 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2007 79.71 71.95 61.64 66.92 5.76 47.01 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 2011 68.94 42.49 40.06 78.34 2.48 83.92 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 2006 46.77 69.54 40.93 72.69 78.12 89.96 69.07 65.92 
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107 Tanzania 2006 27.06 50.59 17.16 33.54 2.61 55.17 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 2006 35.99 52.16 24.19 35.24 3.53 67.77 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 2012 60.28 67.75 52.98 69.97 42.11 84.09 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 2009 59.05 78.48 66.91 81.46 91.77 91.43 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 2010 40.82 37.04 38.46 70.34 40.30 66.51 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 2006 70.58 39.35 17.13 59.33 3.04 50.33 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2014 35.99 54.18 26.38 44.10 1.12 65.01 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 2011 67.26 63.98 39.51 61.09 40.86 86.20 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2006 19.87 28.69 8.76 34.02 1.00 44.96 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 2012 50.36 55.83 16.51 43.66 3.78 73.04 47.36 46.41 
Notes: E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-L when the overall index AEMC attained 
minimum (Gmin) during 2006-2014 
 
 
 
. 
Figure 1.1. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions [Based on 
Maximum Values Attained during 2006-2014] 
 
Table 3.1. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions [Based on 
Maximum Values Gmin Attained during 2006-2014] 
Regimes 
Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations Overall Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Full Democracy 82.4281 82.6881 76.6950 87.3912 81.5250 86.5373 83.4765 84.7481 
Flawed Democracy 69.7478 66.4475 45.0997 67.1508 43.9486 77.3778 64.8567 65.0561 
Hybrid Regime 57.9055 53.4373 36.8527 55.4082 23.4155 71.4786 53.8541 54.5705 
Authoritarian 60.4478 49.8681 32.3872 54.7928 17.8891 69.0788 51.7016 52.3234 
 
Table 3.2. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions 
[Based on Minimum Values Attained during 2006-2014] 
Regimes 
Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations Overall Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Full Democracy 78.0712 76.7454 76.0904 86.8815 78.0554 84.5658 80.5685 81.8246 
Flawed Democracy 61.5794 60.9519 43.1203 66.7581 36.8533 73.6744 60.2900 60.0739 
Hybrid Regime 47.6191 49.6445 34.3482 54.5545 21.3032 67.6200 49.6641 49.6182 
Authoritarian 47.0003 43.6813 31.1909 51.4350 15.5306 62.9647 45.6419 45.9247 
 
In Table-3.1 we present regime-wise mean scores of globalization (for different 
dimensions as well as overall globalization) on the optimistic side (maximum 
globalization during 2006-2014), while in Table-3.2 we present regime-wise mean 
scores of globalization on the pessimistic side (minimum globalization during 
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2006-2014). Fig-1.1 and Fig-1.2 present the same information graphically. We 
observe that as one moves away from Full Democracy to an Authoritarian Regime 
the expected extent (mean) of globalization in all dimensions (as well as overall 
globalization) declines.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions [Based on 
Minimum Values Attained during 2006-2014]  
 
Canonical correlation of democracy and globalization: To dive deeper into the 
relationship between democracy and globalization, we have carried out 
representation constrained canonical correlation analysis of globalization sub-
indices (E1 through P) with democracy sub-indices (EPP through CVL). 
Representation constrained canonical correlation analysis (Mishra, 2009) is slightly 
different from the classical correlation analysis. If CCD=Xw is a composite index 
or score vector of democracy (while X=[EPP,FOG,PPN,PCL,CVL] ;  w=weight 
vector) and CCG=Yv is a composite index or score vector of globalization (while 
Y=[E1,E2,S1,S2,S3,P]; v=weight vector), then the classical canonical correlation 
analysis maximized the squared Pearson’s correlation, 2 ,CCGCCDr , between CCD and 
CCG irrespective of how CCD represents the individual components of X and 
CCG represents the individual components of Y. The representation constrained 
canonical correlation strikes a balance between 2 ,CCGCCDr  and representation of X by 
CCD ( 2 ,XCCDr ) and Y by CCG (
2
,YCCGr ). Therefore, representation constrained 
canonical correlation analysis is a hybrid of the Classical Canonical Correlation 
Analysis and the Principal Component Analysis (Mishra, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013; 
Choi et al., 2017).  
In Table-4.1 we present the canonical correlation scores obtained by different 
countries for democracy (CCD) in 2006 and those for globalization (CCG) during 
2006-2014. The measures of democracy in 2006 have been correlated with the 
optimistic level (for Gmax) of globalization during 2006-2014 (left panel) as well 
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as the pessimistic level (for Gmin) of globalization during 2006-2014 (right panel). 
Table-4.2 represents a similar picture as Table-4.1, except that CCD (democracy 
measures) is for the year 2016.  
 
Table 4.1. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Democracy and Globalization in Different 
Countries for OSC-2006 
SL Country 
Optimistic (For Gmax during 2006-2014) Pessimistic (For Gmin during 2006-2014)  
CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 0.7746 0.9761 5.91 61.60 61.61 0.7374 0.8294 5.91 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 0.8658 0.8487 6.63 59.95 59.19 0.8247 0.8658 6.63 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 1.2790 1.4135 9.09 83.80 84.03 1.2194 1.4315 9.09 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 1.2273 1.6046 8.69 91.87 93.95 1.1686 1.5825 8.69 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 0.4031 0.8148 3.31 57.02 54.69 0.3887 0.8715 3.31 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 0.6208 0.3075 4.51 35.04 34.79 0.5894 0.2638 4.51 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 1.1058 1.6020 8.15 92.41 93.75 1.0554 1.6017 8.15 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 0.8415 0.5797 6.16 46.67 48.99 0.8002 0.5301 6.16 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 0.4926 0.6128 3.72 48.69 49.12 0.4666 0.5661 3.72 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 0.9162 1.2334 7.10 76.98 76.34 0.8736 1.2072 7.10 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 0.7349 0.7805 5.98 54.42 56.38 0.7018 0.8137 5.98 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 0.9588 0.8802 7.38 61.40 58.16 0.9152 0.9005 7.38 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 0.3379 0.5531 2.62 43.58 47.07 0.3292 0.4627 2.62 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 1.0241 0.8330 7.60 55.50 60.64 0.9763 0.7118 7.60 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 0.1523 0.3311 1.61 36.34 37.27 0.1505 0.3399 1.61 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 1.2856 1.4945 9.07 87.15 87.51 1.2280 1.5141 9.07 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 1.2749 1.5203 9.02 88.79 93.18 1.2160 1.5180 9.02 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 1.0479 1.2221 7.89 74.31 72.77 1.0011 1.1972 7.89 71.11 69.54 
19 China 0.4549 0.8700 2.97 62.02 56.85 0.4329 0.8907 2.97 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 0.4794 0.6602 3.38 49.83 53.08 0.4599 0.6789 3.38 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 0.4655 0.5041 3.27 44.20 42.75 0.4472 0.5606 3.27 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 0.3153 0.6923 2.76 51.83 57.31 0.2932 0.5886 2.76 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 0.7966 0.8686 6.40 60.15 58.23 0.7608 0.8434 6.40 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 1.0869 0.9906 8.04 63.66 63.45 1.0369 1.0328 8.04 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 1.0176 1.5060 7.60 87.32 89.36 0.9715 1.3909 7.60 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 1.2456 1.4795 8.82 86.48 87.44 1.1869 1.4588 8.82 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 1.3613 1.5696 9.52 90.01 91.90 1.2975 1.5450 9.52 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 0.7765 0.9941 6.13 66.45 67.20 0.7366 0.8752 6.13 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 0.4327 0.7587 3.17 54.00 53.32 0.4112 0.6324 3.17 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 0.6793 0.7951 5.64 57.39 56.77 0.6511 0.7599 5.64 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 0.5632 0.8841 3.90 63.10 59.62 0.5342 0.8449 3.90 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 1.1677 1.4643 8.34 85.92 86.71 1.1111 1.4603 8.34 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 0.6625 0.3899 4.72 39.33 39.87 0.6305 0.3983 4.72 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 1.3038 1.4955 9.25 87.22 87.36 1.2430 1.5071 9.25 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 0.7259 0.7562 5.66 57.56 61.30 0.6959 0.7625 5.66 53.75 57.81 
36 France 1.1073 1.5287 8.07 88.23 89.36 1.0548 1.5235 8.07 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 0.3941 0.7987 2.72 55.96 59.46 0.3755 0.7084 2.72 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 1.1138 1.5469 8.08 89.06 89.91 1.0596 1.5503 8.08 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 0.6720 0.7547 5.35 54.17 55.67 0.6381 0.7380 5.35 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 0.2456 0.5161 2.02 44.40 46.82 0.2348 0.4965 2.02 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  0.6047 0.7210 4.39 51.78 54.92 0.5736 0.7779 4.39 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 1.1147 1.4031 8.13 82.59 83.44 1.0625 1.3960 8.13 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 0.7495 0.8907 6.07 60.42 57.71 0.7134 0.9173 6.07 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 0.7703 0.8084 6.15 56.44 59.99 0.7358 0.7531 6.15 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 0.8026 0.9046 6.25 61.42 60.57 0.7635 0.9122 6.25 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 0.4763 0.4717 4.19 39.36 38.47 0.4580 0.5433 4.19 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 1.0066 1.4810 7.53 86.99 87.02 0.9587 1.5092 7.53 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 0.8712 0.8677 6.41 59.65 57.96 0.8305 0.8629 6.41 56.64 54.53 
49 India 1.0072 0.6658 7.68 52.38 50.87 0.9624 0.6865 7.68 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 1.2715 1.6213 9.01 92.15 95.20 1.2132 1.5885 9.01 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 1.3990 1.2647 9.71 77.86 81.39 1.3332 1.1542 9.71 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 1.0136 1.2975 7.28 78.15 80.79 0.9575 1.2399 7.28 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 1.0720 1.4004 7.73 82.85 83.57 1.0193 1.3999 7.73 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 0.9716 1.0077 7.34 62.72 66.57 0.9267 0.9642 7.34 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 0.5282 1.1230 3.92 70.31 73.94 0.5041 1.1252 3.92 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 1.1418 1.1331 8.15 72.26 68.81 1.0869 1.1151 8.15 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 0.7132 0.5773 5.08 46.46 45.80 0.6802 0.6100 5.08 45.16 42.55 
58 Cambodia 0.6188 0.6878 4.77 50.69 54.22 0.5869 0.6840 4.77 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  1.0849 1.0354 7.88 67.03 66.05 1.0307 1.0417 7.88 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 0.4295 1.1308 3.09 70.76 72.18 0.4100 1.1020 3.09 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 0.7752 1.1472 5.82 70.50 74.20 0.7338 1.1230 5.82 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 0.8638 0.5626 6.48 45.94 48.77 0.8217 0.4429 6.48 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 1.2824 1.5214 9.10 85.62 89.59 1.2222 1.4866 9.10 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 0.5289 1.0043 3.90 65.95 64.33 0.5021 0.8662 3.90 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 0.8321 0.9816 6.50 64.04 61.70 0.7917 1.0004 6.50 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 0.8180 0.4773 5.82 42.90 42.98 0.7777 0.4861 5.82 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 0.8558 0.9403 6.67 62.29 61.61 0.8170 0.9450 6.67 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 0.7765 0.5563 5.99 46.07 46.72 0.7358 0.5721 5.99 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 1.1786 1.2968 8.39 76.16 78.24 1.1233 1.3595 8.39 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 0.2561 0.4220 1.77 39.03 38.40 0.2402 0.3583 1.77 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 0.8530 1.0945 6.57 65.48 66.92 0.8094 1.0372 6.57 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 0.8490 0.8069 6.60 56.91 55.63 0.8072 0.7220 6.60 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 0.3808 0.7054 3.12 51.45 52.55 0.3690 0.5540 3.12 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 1.1108 1.0656 8.04 66.61 66.81 1.0588 1.0505 8.04 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 0.6316 0.5581 4.97 45.40 46.09 0.6019 0.5237 4.97 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 0.8405 1.2848 5.98 79.12 81.07 0.7986 1.3119 5.98 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 0.4035 0.6192 3.54 47.92 50.86 0.3839 0.4977 3.54 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 0.4584 0.7116 3.52 54.36 52.53 0.4376 0.7151 3.52 50.24 48.17 
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79 Nicaragua 0.6883 0.7379 5.68 53.99 53.56 0.6560 0.8015 5.68 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 1.3996 1.6307 9.66 92.84 95.24 1.3349 1.6499 9.66 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 1.3452 1.4254 9.55 84.48 86.83 1.2854 1.4429 9.55 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 0.4878 0.3943 3.42 38.18 36.70 0.4744 0.4035 3.42 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 1.2565 1.3690 9.01 79.17 80.12 1.1990 1.3995 9.01 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 0.4849 0.6549 3.92 51.83 51.16 0.4624 0.7048 3.92 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 0.9599 1.0566 7.35 67.70 67.56 0.9152 1.0683 7.35 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 0.7759 1.0330 6.11 66.14 65.24 0.7381 0.9937 6.11 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 0.7959 0.8145 6.48 58.39 59.19 0.7617 0.8386 6.48 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 0.9540 1.3383 7.30 81.32 79.32 0.9100 1.3318 7.30 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 1.1172 1.5115 8.16 87.61 88.21 1.0649 1.4770 8.16 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 0.7785 0.8669 6.16 60.13 59.39 0.7454 0.8864 6.16 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 0.9081 1.2433 7.06 76.51 73.36 0.8657 1.0929 7.06 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 0.5013 0.5692 3.82 45.56 43.83 0.4808 0.3996 3.82 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 0.2533 1.0840 1.92 68.43 69.75 0.2422 1.1125 1.92 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 0.6989 0.7559 5.37 54.64 54.59 0.6623 0.7566 5.37 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 0.8371 1.5438 5.89 88.27 91.52 0.8021 1.5256 5.89 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 0.4167 0.5642 3.57 45.90 48.29 0.3940 0.4458 3.57 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 0.7687 0.9849 6.22 63.79 64.02 0.7321 0.9676 6.22 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 1.4171 1.5470 9.88 89.41 91.73 1.3524 1.5115 9.88 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 0.3514 0.6192 2.93 47.48 51.92 0.3417 0.6222 2.93 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 0.3698 0.6721 2.36 48.93 50.02 0.3490 0.6486 2.36 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 0.2128 0.3724 1.65 38.37 41.70 0.2040 0.4417 1.65 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 0.2485 0.7210 1.75 53.70 54.25 0.2344 0.6608 1.75 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 0.7749 1.0986 5.67 72.06 71.71 0.7432 1.0008 5.67 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 0.9458 0.9655 7.18 63.09 65.62 0.9015 0.9718 7.18 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 0.4657 0.8987 3.06 60.45 60.63 0.4468 0.9225 3.06 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 0.7074 1.1101 5.70 71.33 69.88 0.6723 1.1215 5.70 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 0.6923 0.3870 5.18 37.71 37.42 0.6575 0.4426 5.18 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 0.7095 0.5661 5.14 45.48 45.69 0.6798 0.5805 5.14 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 1.0645 1.0544 7.96 67.23 68.14 1.0146 1.1097 7.96 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 1.1680 1.3734 8.22 81.80 81.15 1.1119 1.3657 8.22 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 0.7026 0.7682 5.42 56.17 55.45 0.6675 0.7335 5.42 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 0.3752 0.7605 2.75 56.69 54.98 0.3582 0.5886 2.75 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 0.3829 0.5997 2.98 46.51 46.66 0.3625 0.6098 2.98 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 1.0840 1.0248 7.91 66.72 67.54 1.0352 1.0427 7.91 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 0.3153 0.4504 2.76 41.67 42.31 0.2932 0.2168 2.76 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 0.7097 0.7416 5.25 52.96 54.04 0.6776 0.6740 5.25 47.36 46.41 
 
Table 4.2. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Democracy and Globalization in Different 
Countries for OSC-2016 
SL Country 
Optimistic (for Gmax during 2006-2014) Pessimistic (for Gmin during 2006-2014) 
CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 0.7271 1.0223 5.91 61.60 61.61 0.7578 0.9931 5.91 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 0.8128 0.8888 6.96 59.95 59.19 0.8470 0.8634 6.96 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 1.2006 1.4803 9.01 83.80 84.03 1.2512 1.4380 9.01 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 1.1521 1.6804 8.41 91.87 93.95 1.2006 1.6324 8.41 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 0.3784 0.8533 2.65 57.02 54.69 0.3944 0.8289 2.65 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 0.5827 0.3220 2.40 35.04 34.79 0.6073 0.3128 2.40 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 1.0380 1.6777 7.77 92.41 93.75 1.0818 1.6298 7.77 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 0.7899 0.6071 5.67 46.67 48.99 0.8232 0.5898 5.67 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 0.4624 0.6417 4.70 48.69 49.12 0.4819 0.6234 4.70 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 0.8600 1.2916 7.01 76.98 76.34 0.8963 1.2547 7.01 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 0.6899 0.8174 5.63 54.42 56.38 0.7190 0.7940 5.63 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 0.9000 0.9218 6.90 61.40 58.16 0.9380 0.8955 6.90 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 0.3171 0.5793 4.93 43.58 47.07 0.3305 0.5627 4.93 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 0.9613 0.8724 7.87 55.50 60.64 1.0018 0.8475 7.87 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 0.1430 0.3468 1.61 36.34 37.27 0.1490 0.3369 1.61 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 1.2068 1.5651 9.15 87.15 87.51 1.2577 1.5204 9.15 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 1.1968 1.5921 9.09 88.79 93.18 1.2472 1.5467 9.09 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 0.9837 1.2798 7.78 74.31 72.77 1.0252 1.2432 7.78 71.11 69.54 
19 China 0.4270 0.9110 3.14 62.02 56.85 0.4450 0.8850 3.14 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 0.4500 0.6914 3.81 49.83 53.08 0.4690 0.6716 3.81 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 0.4369 0.5279 3.46 44.20 42.75 0.4554 0.5128 3.46 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 0.2960 0.7249 2.91 51.83 57.31 0.3085 0.7043 2.91 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 0.7477 0.9096 6.67 60.15 58.23 0.7793 0.8836 6.67 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 1.0203 1.0374 7.88 63.66 63.45 1.0633 1.0078 7.88 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 0.9552 1.5771 7.65 87.32 89.36 0.9955 1.5321 7.65 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 1.1692 1.5494 8.63 86.48 87.44 1.2185 1.5052 8.63 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 1.2778 1.6437 9.20 90.01 91.90 1.3317 1.5968 9.20 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 0.7289 1.0411 6.67 66.45 67.20 0.7596 1.0114 6.67 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 0.4062 0.7946 3.56 54.00 53.32 0.4233 0.7719 3.56 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 0.6377 0.8326 5.81 57.39 56.77 0.6646 0.8089 5.81 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 0.5287 0.9258 3.31 63.10 59.62 0.5510 0.8994 3.31 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 1.0961 1.5334 8.30 85.92 86.71 1.1423 1.4896 8.30 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 0.6218 0.4083 3.60 39.33 39.87 0.6481 0.3967 3.60 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 1.2238 1.5661 9.03 87.22 87.36 1.2755 1.5214 9.03 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 0.6814 0.7919 5.64 57.56 61.30 0.7102 0.7693 5.64 53.75 57.81 
36 France 1.0394 1.6009 7.92 88.23 89.36 1.0833 1.5552 7.92 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 0.3699 0.8364 3.74 55.96 59.46 0.3855 0.8125 3.74 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 1.0455 1.6200 8.36 89.06 89.91 1.0896 1.5737 8.36 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 0.6308 0.7903 6.75 54.17 55.67 0.6574 0.7677 6.75 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 0.2306 0.5405 3.14 44.40 46.82 0.2403 0.5251 3.14 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  0.5676 0.7551 2.91 51.78 54.92 0.5915 0.7335 2.91 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 1.0464 1.4694 7.23 82.59 83.44 1.0905 1.4274 7.23 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 0.7036 0.9328 5.92 60.42 57.71 0.7333 0.9062 5.92 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 0.7230 0.8465 6.25 56.44 59.99 0.7535 0.8224 6.25 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 0.7534 0.9473 5.92 61.42 60.57 0.7851 0.9202 5.92 58.38 57.05 
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46 Haiti 0.4471 0.4940 4.02 39.36 38.47 0.4659 0.4799 4.02 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 0.9449 1.5510 6.72 86.99 87.02 0.9847 1.5067 6.72 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 0.8178 0.9087 6.97 59.65 57.96 0.8523 0.8827 6.97 56.64 54.53 
49 India 0.9455 0.6972 7.81 52.38 50.87 0.9853 0.6773 7.81 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 1.1935 1.6978 9.15 92.15 95.20 1.2439 1.6494 9.15 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 1.3132 1.3244 9.50 77.86 81.39 1.3686 1.2866 9.50 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 0.9515 1.3588 7.85 78.15 80.79 0.9916 1.3200 7.85 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 1.0062 1.4666 7.98 82.85 83.57 1.0487 1.4247 7.98 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 0.9121 1.0553 7.39 62.72 66.57 0.9505 1.0252 7.39 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 0.4958 1.1760 3.96 70.31 73.94 0.5167 1.1425 3.96 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 1.0718 1.1865 7.99 72.26 68.81 1.1170 1.1527 7.99 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 0.6695 0.6046 5.33 46.46 45.80 0.6977 0.5873 5.33 45.16 42.55 
58 Cambodia 0.5809 0.7203 4.27 50.69 54.22 0.6054 0.6997 4.27 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  1.0184 1.0843 7.92 67.03 66.05 1.0613 1.0533 7.92 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 0.4031 1.1843 3.85 70.76 72.18 0.4201 1.1504 3.85 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 0.7277 1.2014 4.86 70.50 74.20 0.7583 1.1671 4.86 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 0.8108 0.5891 6.59 45.94 48.77 0.8450 0.5723 6.59 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 1.2038 1.5933 8.81 85.62 89.59 1.2545 1.5478 8.81 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 0.4964 1.0517 4.77 65.95 64.33 0.5174 1.0217 4.77 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 0.7811 1.0280 6.01 64.04 61.70 0.8140 0.9986 6.01 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 0.7678 0.4998 5.07 42.90 42.98 0.8002 0.4856 5.07 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 0.8033 0.9847 6.47 62.29 61.61 0.8372 0.9566 6.47 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 0.7290 0.5826 5.70 46.07 46.72 0.7597 0.5660 5.70 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 1.1064 1.3581 8.39 76.16 78.24 1.1530 1.3193 8.39 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 0.2403 0.4419 4.20 39.03 38.40 0.2505 0.4293 4.20 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 0.8007 1.1463 5.72 65.48 66.92 0.8344 1.1135 5.72 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 0.7970 0.8451 6.62 56.91 55.63 0.8306 0.8209 6.62 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 0.3575 0.7388 3.96 51.45 52.55 0.3726 0.7177 3.96 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 1.0427 1.1160 8.28 66.61 66.81 1.0866 1.0841 8.28 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 0.5928 0.5845 5.55 45.40 46.09 0.6178 0.5678 5.55 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 0.7890 1.3454 6.54 79.12 81.07 0.8222 1.3070 6.54 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 0.3788 0.6484 3.96 47.92 50.86 0.3947 0.6299 3.96 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 0.4302 0.7452 4.50 54.36 52.53 0.4484 0.7240 4.50 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 0.6461 0.7727 4.81 53.99 53.56 0.6733 0.7507 4.81 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 1.3137 1.7077 8.80 92.84 95.24 1.3692 1.6590 8.80 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 1.2627 1.4928 9.93 84.48 86.83 1.3160 1.4502 9.93 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 0.4578 0.4129 4.86 38.18 36.70 0.4771 0.4011 4.86 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 1.1794 1.4338 9.26 79.17 80.12 1.2292 1.3928 9.26 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 0.4552 0.6858 4.33 51.83 51.16 0.4744 0.6662 4.33 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 0.9011 1.1065 7.13 67.70 67.56 0.9390 1.0750 7.13 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 0.7283 1.0818 6.65 66.14 65.24 0.7590 1.0508 6.65 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 0.7471 0.8529 6.94 58.39 59.19 0.7786 0.8286 6.94 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 0.8955 1.4015 6.83 81.32 79.32 0.9332 1.3615 6.83 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 1.0487 1.5829 7.86 87.61 88.21 1.0929 1.5377 7.86 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 0.7308 0.9078 6.27 60.13 59.39 0.7616 0.8819 6.27 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 0.8524 1.3020 6.62 76.51 73.36 0.8884 1.2649 6.62 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 0.4705 0.5961 3.07 45.56 43.83 0.4903 0.5790 3.07 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 0.2377 1.1352 1.93 68.43 69.75 0.2478 1.1028 1.93 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 0.6561 0.7916 6.21 54.64 54.59 0.6837 0.7690 6.21 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 0.7857 1.6168 6.38 88.27 91.52 0.8188 1.5706 6.38 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 0.3912 0.5909 4.55 45.90 48.29 0.4077 0.5740 4.55 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 0.7216 1.0314 6.64 63.79 64.02 0.7520 1.0019 6.64 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 1.3302 1.6201 9.39 89.41 91.73 1.3863 1.5738 9.39 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 0.3299 0.6485 3.03 47.48 51.92 0.3438 0.6300 3.03 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 0.3471 0.7039 1.43 48.93 50.02 0.3617 0.6838 1.43 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 0.1998 0.3900 1.50 38.37 41.70 0.2082 0.3789 1.50 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 0.2332 0.7551 3.32 53.70 54.25 0.2430 0.7335 3.32 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 0.7274 1.1505 4.92 72.06 71.71 0.7581 1.1176 4.92 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 0.8878 1.0111 7.10 63.09 65.62 0.9253 0.9823 7.10 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 0.4371 0.9411 6.40 60.45 60.63 0.4555 0.9143 6.40 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 0.6641 1.1625 5.04 71.33 69.88 0.6921 1.1294 5.04 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 0.6499 0.4053 5.76 37.71 37.42 0.6773 0.3937 5.76 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 0.6660 0.5929 5.26 45.48 45.69 0.6941 0.5759 5.26 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 0.9992 1.1042 8.17 67.23 68.14 1.0414 1.0726 8.17 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 1.0964 1.4383 7.98 81.80 81.15 1.1426 1.3972 7.98 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 0.6595 0.8044 4.68 56.17 55.45 0.6873 0.7815 4.68 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 0.3522 0.7964 3.38 56.69 54.98 0.3671 0.7737 3.38 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 0.3594 0.6281 2.07 46.51 46.66 0.3746 0.6101 2.07 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 1.0176 1.0732 7.41 66.72 67.54 1.0605 1.0425 7.41 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 0.2960 0.4716 1.93 41.67 42.31 0.3085 0.4581 1.93 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 0.6662 0.7766 5.99 52.96 54.04 0.6943 0.7544 5.99 47.36 46.41 
 
In Table-5.1 we present the weights assigned to different measures of 
democracy and also those of globalization in constructing CCD and CCG (reported 
in Table-4.1). It also reports the Pearson’s correlation of different measures of 
democracy (EPP through CVL) with CCD and the Pearson’s correlation of 
different measures of globalization (E1 through P) with CCG. The weights and 
correlations are presented for optimistic as well as pessimistic attainments of 
globalization during 2006-2014. The representation correlation of democracy 
(Regime) for the optimistic globalization is 0.8839 while that for the pessimistic 
globalization is 0.8838. This correlation measures how best the CCD represents its 
constituents (EPP through CVL).   The representation correlation of globalization 
for the optimistic globalization is 0.8053 while that for the pessimistic 
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globalization is 0.7966. This correlation measures how best the CCG represents its 
constituents (E1 through P). For the optimistic globalization, the representation 
constrained canonical correlation between CCD and CCG is 0.7879. This 
correlation measures how CCD and CCG are vary together. The classical canonical 
correlation is 0.8106. The representation constrained canonical correlation loses 
only slightly (is reduced from 0.8106 to 0.7879) for a better representation of 
democracy measures by CCD and globalization measures by CCG. Similarly for 
pessimistic globalization as well, only a little is lost (0.7966 in place of 0.0.81495) 
for a better representation.    
 
Table 5.1. Analysis of Canonical Correlation between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime 
and Extent of Globalization 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax Weight 0.1779 0.3011 0.3383 0.3967 0.2334 0.3112 0.3746 0.3366 0.1932 0.1608 0.3711 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7954 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1469 0.2933 0.3294 0.3665 0.2442 0.2988 0.3924 0.3431 0.2212 0.1453 0.3987 
Correln 0.8723 0.9307 0.9165 0.7941 0.9055 0.7818 0.8651 0.8712 0.9157 0.8834 0.5716 
Notes: Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation 
(Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8838; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8148; 
Canonical Correlation=0.7966(0.81495) 
 
A similar analysis is presented in Table-5.2 while the democracy measures 
pertain to the year 2016. There, too, representation is high as well as canonical 
correlation between CCD and CCG is high. The loss of correlation for better 
representation is very small. All these results indicate that democracy and 
globalization are concordant with each other. A perusal of Table-5.1 and Table-5.2 
also reveals that the correlation of Functioning of Government (FOG) bears 
strongest correlation with CCG and Flow of Information (S2) bears the strongest 
relationship with CCD. Political Participation (PPN) and Trans-border Personal 
Contacts (S1) are the second most important aspects that join democracy and 
globalization. The measure of Political dimension of globalization (P) is the 
weakest of all variables.  
It is fairly likely that democracy (as measured by EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and 
CVL) in 2006 promotes globalization (as measured by E1, E2, S1, S2 and P) in the 
later years. However, it would be a little far-fetched to assert that globalization in 
2006-2014 (or min/max values of the overall globalization) promoted democracy 
witnessed in 2016. The coefficient of response to change in democracy index to the 
change in globalization is -0.002, which is not different from zero. The scatter of 
change in democracy index to change in globalization index is presented in Fig-3.   
 
Table 5.2. Analysis of Canonical Correlation between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime 
and Extent of Globalization 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2016 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.1671 0.2827 0.3175 0.3724 0.2191 0.3259 0.3923 0.3526 0.2024 0.1684 0.3886 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7953 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1740 0.2946 0.3310 0.3880 0.2283 0.3166 0.3810 0.3425 0.1966 0.1636 0.3775 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7953 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Notes: Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation 
(Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; 
Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.81063) 
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Figure 3. Response of Democracy Index to Changes in Extent of Globalization  
 
10. A closer analysis of Asian and African countries  
One of the arguments apparently supporting the Lee thesis was that democracy 
and Asian values have an inherent incompatibility and, therefore, especially in the 
East-Asian countries, democratic governments would not succeed in fostering 
development, while authoritarian governments would do. This might also be true 
for all Asian countries. This conclusion appears to be supported if we cursorily 
look at the mean levels of the indicators of democracy vis-à-vis the indicators of 
globalization during 2006-2014. We present such mean levels of indicators 
(continent-wise) in Table-6.1 (optimistic view of globalization) and Table-6.2 
(pessimistic view of globalization). Asian countries perform poorly (vis-à-vis 
African countries) at the measures of democracy and yet they have performed 
better than African countries. 
 
Table 6.1. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Optimistic view) in 
Different Continents- 2006-2014 
 
OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Asia 3.15 2.88 1.75 3.06 4.07 3.97 60.38 63.77 30.75 59.76 18.32 58.13 51.77 50.68 
Africa 4.88 4.84 3.97 3.61 6.25 5.74 43.89 48.67 24.47 41.46 3.60 68.05 44.00 44.42 
Others 8.66 9.38 8.40 7.50 8.75 9.27 69.98 83.29 70.27 85.00 92.97 90.91 82.80 82.59 
Total 6.37 6.59 5.58 5.56 7.50 6.62 44.35 59.36 44.08 59.84 47.50 77.14 58.42 57.97 
 
Table 6.2. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Pessimistic view) in 
Different Continents- 2006-2014 
 
OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Asia 3.15 2.88 1.75 3.06 4.07 3.97 47.98 56.09 32.64 61.53 17.82 60.26 49.17 47.71 
Africa 4.88 4.84 3.97 3.61 6.25 5.74 37.21 45.50 16.74 39.53 3.97 55.01 37.63 36.67 
Others 8.66 9.38 8.40 7.50 8.75 9.27 63.73 78.25 70.35 83.63 92.34 90.93 80.56 80.36 
Total 6.37 6.59 5.58 5.56 7.50 6.62 41.56 56.83 41.94 58.43 47.96 64.20 53.52 52.70 
 
However, it has been empirically observed that democratic states often earn 
fewer monopoly rents and produce a higher level of services than autocracies and, 
therefore, democracy has real and substantively important effects on the daily lives 
and well-being of individuals around the globe (Lake & Baum, 2001). It also 
causes growth and investment to rise (Rock, 2009). The imports of ‘Asian Values’ 
and the Lee thesis go all against such facts. Furthermore, Sen (1997; 1999) has 
questioned the existence or prevalence of any such values (supporting 
authoritarianism and downplaying freedom, democratic intents, tolerance, etc.) that 
could be said to be characteristically Asian or shared by all Asian countries in 
common. ‘Asian values’, whatever they are, may have a role but it would be wrong 
to suggest that they are the determining factor in the outcomes. If a case could ever 
be made for ‘Asian values’, it would not be as a coherent, ahistorical, monolithic 
bloc (Takashi & Newman, 1997; Barr, 2000). So much divergence in views calls 
for an empirical examination of the status of globalization (as a path to 
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development) of Asian countries vis-à-vis the regime type. We must go beyond the 
averages and look into co-movement and correlation. In Table-7 we present the 
findings of (representation constrained) canonical correlation analysis for 26 Asian 
countries included in our study. Eurasian countries (such as Azerbaijan, Turkey) 
are included in Asia since geographically they are more a part of Asia than Europe.  
We find that the sub-indices of globalization and the sub-indices of democracy are 
highly correlated even if we take a pessimistic view of globalization attained 
during 2006-2014. 
 
Table 7. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and 
Extent of Globalization (Asia#) 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.1834 0.3015 0.3725 0.3366 0.2085 0.3019 0.4197 0.2045 0.2032 0.0612 0.4752 
Correln 0.8986 0.8090 0.8810 0.6428 0.8446 0.6112 0.7991 0.7481 0.8524 0.8444 0.5162 
Gmin Weight 0.2241 0.3174 0.3897 0.3793 0.2590 0.2754 0.3818 0.2152 0.2271 0.0755 0.4012 
Correln 0.9032 0.8061 0.8784 0.6381 0.8530 0.7089 0.8287 0.7454 0.8661 0.8225 0.3919 
Notes: Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8152; Own Correlation 
(Globalization)=0.7285; Canonical Correlation= 0.6386 (0.8612)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8158; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7273; 
Canonical Correlation=0.5880(0.7379) 
# : Includes 26 countries in Asia (and Eurasia). 
 
A similar analysis for 38 African countries (see Table-8) reveals that democracy 
supports globalization although the role of the political dimension of globalization 
(P) is faltering and exhibits a negative correlation, but only for the optimistic view 
of globalization. Thus, the political aspect of globalization is a drag on other 
dimensions of globalization in African countries. 
 
Table 8. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and 
Extent of Globalization (Africa#) 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 
0.2070 0.4038 0.2182 0.3151 0.3413 0.1999 0.4500 0.2890 0.1713 0.3280 
-
0.2606 
Correln 
0.8491 0.9473 0.8198 0.6578 0.9064 0.6192 0.7462 0.8044 0.7481 0.5712 
-
0.2467 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1481 0.3115 0.2837 0.3194 0.3108 0.2706 0.5132 0.2714 0.2332 0.2969 0.2215 
Correln 0.8345 0.9408 0.8372 0.6787 0.8940 0.4636 0.7436 0.6703 0.8396 0.7565 0.3302 
Notes: Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8361; Own Correlation 
(Globalization)=0.6226; Canonical Correlation=0.4396(0.7062)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8371; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.6340; 
Canonical Correlation=0.5025(0.7120) 
#: Includes 38 countries in Africa. 
 
Table 9. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and 
Extent of Globalization (Others) 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.3241 0.1465 0.2229 0.4022 0.1970 0.3658 0.3337 0.3789 0.2676 0.2496 0.3171 
Correln 0.8360 0.9069 0.8722 0.9393 0.9004 0.7702 0.7620 0.8905 0.8979 0.8286 0.6578 
Gmin 
Weight 0.3549 0.1969 0.2508 0.4372 0.2497 0.3247 0.2843 0.4227 0.2356 0.1844 0.2539 
Correln 0.8349 0.9123 0.8688 0.9371 0.9051 0.8125 0.7369 0.8849 0.8759 0.8401 0.5958 
Notes: Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8910; Own Correlation 
(Globalization)=0.8012; Canonical Correlation=0.8914(0.9159)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8916; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7910; 
Canonical Correlation=0.8933(0.9200) 
Others include 52 Non-Asian, Non-African and Non-Eurasian countries, i.e. the countries in 
Australia, Americas and Europe.  
 
A similar type of analysis for other countries (in Australia, Americas and 
Europe) suggests that the (representation constrained) canonical correlation 
between globalization and democracy is more than in Asia and Africa (Table-9). A 
summary of the coefficients of canonical correlation analysis is presented in Table-
10. There is a clear indication that as we move from African countries to non-
African and non-Asian countries (i.e. Australian, American and European 
countries), the concordance between political regime and globalization increases.   
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Table 10. A Summary of Canonical Correlation between Globalization and 
Democracy/Political Regime 
View of 
Globalization 
African countries 
(38) 
Asian Countries 
(26) 
Other Countries 
(52) 
All Countries 
(116) 
Optimistic (Gmax) 0.4396 0.6386 0.8914 0.7879 
Pessimistic (Gmin) 0.5025 0.5880 0.8933 0.7966 
 
11. Distribution of countries by regime type and globalization 
score 
In Table-11 we present the countries classified according to the regime type and 
the overall globalization index (score). Of 116 countries, 25 are full democracies 
and 34 are flawed democracies.  Full democracy countries have globalization score 
60 and above. Flawed democracies mostly obtain globalization score 40 to 60, 
although Hungary and Italy are highly globalized while Lesotho is only poorly 
globalized.  
 
Table-11. Classification of countries according to Regime type and level of Globalization 
(GI=Overall Globalization Index) 
 GI 80 and above GI from 60 to <80 GI from 40 to <60 GI less than 40 
Democracy index 
(OSC) 8 and above 
(Full Democracy) 
Australia, Austria,, 
Belgium, Canada, 
Switzerland, 
Germany ,                
Denmark, Spain, 
Finland                 
France, U.K.,  
Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg,             
Netherlands, 
Norway,                 
Portugal, Sweden                 
(18 countries) 
Costa Rica, 
Iceland,                 
Japan, Malta, 
Mauritius,               
New_Zealand, 
U.S.A. 
(7 countries) Nil Nil 
Democracy index 
(OSC) 6 to < 8 
(Flawed 
Democracy) 
Hungary, Italy 
(2 countries) 
Bulgaria, Chile, 
Cyprus,                  
Israel, Jamaica, 
South Korea, 
Panama, Peru,                     
Poland, Romania, 
Uruguay, South 
Africa           (12 
countries) 
Argentina, Benin, 
Brazil,                  
Botswana, Colombia,                
Dominic Republic, 
Guatemala,  Guyana,      
Honduras, Indonesia,              
India, Moldova,            
Mexico, Montenegro, 
Mongolia, 
Philippines,             
Paraguay, 
El_Salvador,           
Trinidad &Tobago          
(19 countries) 
Lesotho   
(1 country) 
Democracy index 
(OSC) 4 to < 6 
(Hybrid Regime) 
Singapore 
(1 country) 
Lebanon, Malaysia,                 
Thailand, Turkey                  
(4 countries) 
Albania, Bolivia,                  
Ecuador, Fiji, Ghana,                   
Gambia, Kenya, 
Cambodia, Mali, 
Malawi,                 
Nicaragua, Senegal,                 
Uganda,Venezuela,            
Zambia 
(15 countries) 
Burundi, Ethiopia,                
Haiti, Madagascar,              
Tanzania  
(5 countries) 
Democracy index 
(OSC)  Less than 4 
(Authoritarian 
Regime) 
Nil Jordan, Kuwait,                  
Saudi Arabia  
(3 countries) 
Azerbaijan, Burkina 
Faso, China,                   
Cote d'Ivoire, 
Cameroon, Congo 
Rep,              Algeria, 
Egypt, Gabon,                   
Guinea, Morocco,                
Mauritania, Niger,                  
Nigeria, Pakistan,              
Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Rep, Togo, 
Tunisia,                
Vietnam, Yemen 
Rep.             (21 
countries) 
Bhutan, 
Central_Afric Rep,  
Myanmar, Nepal,                   
Rwanda, Sierra  
Leone,            
Chad, Congo 
Democrat Rep.  
(8 countries) 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(2), S.K. Mishra, p.127-151. 
148 
On the other hand, 25 countries have hybrid regimes and the majority of them 
(15 countries) score 40 to 60 score of the globalization index. Only Singapore 
scores high on globalization index. Four countries (Lebanon, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Turkey) score between 60 and 80 on the globalization index. Five countries 
(Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar and Tanzania) score poorly on globalization 
index. Among 32 countries that have authoritarian government, only three 
countries (Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) score 60 to 80 on the globalization 
index and other 29 countries score 60 or less. This simple classification scheme 
also suggests that democratic countries have higher degree of concordance with 
globalization. 
 
Let ijf  be the elements of an observed frequency matrix, ),( nnF ,  
 
n
j iji
fF
1
and .
1 
n
i ijj
fF Similarly, let 
ij =  
n
i iji
FFF
1
/  be the 
elements of expected frequency matrix, ),( nn ,   
n
j iji 1
 and 
.
1 
n
i ijj
 Let ),( nnD be the matrix of normalized squared difference 
between F and  such that ./)( 2 ijijijij fd  Then,   
n
i
n
j ij
d
1 1
  is the 
sum of squared deviations of ijf from ij normalized by .ij This can be 
decomposed into two parts: the sum of the diagonal elements of dnnD ),,(
 
n
i ii
d
1
(which is the trace of D) and the sum of off-diagonal elements of 
odnnD ),,( .1, ;  
n
ji jiij
d  With d , and od we may define  /ddr  and 
.1/ dodod rr    In this accounting od  weakens the relationship. Larger is 
the value of dr higher is the correlation between the attributes measured along the 
rows and the columns of F. This analysis of association of Regime type with 
(optimistic) extent of Globalization attained by different countries during 2006-
2014 has been presented in Table-12. We find that  /ddr  = 0.57192 = 
47.89981475/83.75227. It shows a week positive relationship between regime type 
and globalization, but strong enough to reject the hypothesis that authoritarianism 
induces higher degree of globalization. This exercise also suggests that any 
analysis at the gross level (using averages or frequencies) might be weak and 
possibly misleading as well. A more sensitive technique like canonical correlation 
analysis delves deeper into such investigations. 
 
Table 12. Analysis of Association of Regime Type with Observed (optimistic) extent of 
Globalization during 2006-2014 
DI 
and 
GI 
Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of F(4,4) Expected Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of Φ(4,4) Normalized Squared Differences D(4,4) 
GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total 
DI1 18 7 0 0 25 4.53 5.60 11.85 3.02 25 40.11 0.35 11.85 3.02 55.33 
DI2 2 12 19 1 34 6.16 7.62 16.12 4.10 34 2.81 2.52 0.51 2.35 8.18 
DI3 1 4 15 5 25 4.53 5.60 11.85 3.02 25 2.75 0.46 0.84 1.30 5.34 
DI4 0 3 21 8 32 5.79 7.17 15.17 3.86 32 5.79 2.43 2.24 4.43 14.89 
Total 21 26 55 14 116 21 26 55 14 116 51.46 5.75 15.44 11.10 83.75 
Notes: DI classified into DI1 = Full Democracy; DI2 = Flawed Democracy; DI3 = Hybrid Regime; 
DI4 = Authoritarian. 
GI classified into GI1 = [80-100]=Very high; GI2 = [60-80)=High ; GI3 = [40-60) = Moderate; GI4 = 
[0-40) = Low or Poor.  
 
12. Concluding remarks 
In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship 
between political regime type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and 
the extent of globalization which of late has been considered as a path to 
development. We have made use of the Democracy index (and its constituent 
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indicators) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the globalization index 
(and its constituent indicators) as provided by the KOF. Applying canonical 
correlation analysis on the data we have made an attempt to look into the response 
of globalization to the quantitative measures of democratic (versus authoritarian) 
practices of the governments in 116 countries distributed over Asia, Africa, 
Australia, Europe and the Americas. We have also tested the Lee thesis in the 
context of globalization as a path to development.  Our findings indicate that the 
empirical support to Lee’s thesis if extended to globalization as a path to 
development is superficial and does not withstand critical analysis. Contrary to 
Lee’s thesis, democracy promotes globalization. In African countries political 
discordance (at the national as well as international level) is not much favourable 
while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective of regime type,  is more or 
less in concordance with globalization. Therefore, rather illusively, it so appears 
that democracies thwart development as well as globalization as a means to 
development by implication, while the reality is very different. 
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